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provide information ranging 
from the morphology and 
uses of plant species to the 
history of plant exploration 
and the European discovery 
of Africa.
The RBG Kew has 
contributed historical material, 
including maps and papers 
from David Livingstone’s 
South East Africa Expedition 
Papers and over 2,000 sheets 
of Africa-related material from 
the Director’s Correspondence 
covering early botanical 
exploration of tropical Africa. 
Two major works, The Flora of 
West Tropical Africa and the 
Useful Plants of West Tropical 
Africa, are now available 
electronically for the first 
time, as are more than 1,200 
original illustrations from 
Curtis’ Botanical magazine. 
Other works include La 
Flora du Cameroun, Flora 
Zambesiaca and Flowering 
Plants of South Africa.
Collections soon to be 
added include watercolour 
drawings of macrophytes, 
ethnobotany data, a set of 
scholarly reference volumes 
from the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the 
Medbase medicinal and 
traditional uses database from 
South Africa and the flora of 
Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Vulnerable: A photo of flowers of 
Delonix regia, an increasingly rare 
native of Madagascar, now accessi-
ble at the API. (Picture: RBG Kew.)Quick guide
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What is episodic memory? 
Endel Tulving coined the term 
‘episodic memory’ in 1972 to 
refer to our ability to recall 
specific past events about what 
happened where and when. 
Episodic memory is distinct 
from other kinds of memory in 
being explicitly located in the 
past and accompanied by the 
feeling of remembering, whereas 
other knowledge that we acquire 
is purely factual, without any 
personalised pastness attached 
to it. 
As William James, the famous 
psychologist, once wrote 
“Memory requires more than 
the mere dating of a fact in the 
past. It must be dated in my 
past.” (James, 1890, p. 650). It 
is for this reason that Tulving 
makes the distinction between 
remembering and knowing. Each 
of us remembers what happened 
when we last went to London, for 
example, whereas although we 
know that London is the capital 
of England we do not remember 
when this fact was learned. 
Some memories are more 
vivid than others but, even when 
we do not have a very accurate 
memory of a particular event, we 
do know that we experienced 
the event at some point in our 
past, even though the memory 
of the event is current. To do so, 
we travel mentally back in time 
to reconstruct and re- experience 
the event.
Tulving has suggested that 
the development of civilization 
and culture was, and is, critically 
dependent on this awareness of 
our continued existence in time. 
With physical time, the past can 
influence the present, and the 
present can affect the future, 
but there is no way in which the 
future can influence anything 
that happens in the present. With 
mental time travel, however, we can go backwards as well as 
forwards in time in our mind’s 
eye.
For normal healthy humans 
this ability to reminisce about 
specific past events is an integral 
part of our daily lives. We often 
take it for granted because 
these episodic memories 
happen automatically, and often 
without any deliberate intent 
to remember. However, not all 
humans are capable of episodic 
remembering. Indeed, episodic 
memory develops relatively late, 
and is not fully developed until 
about four years of age. It is also 
the most fragile kind of memory, 
the first to be lost in Alzheimer’s 
disease and other debilitating 
neurodegenerative diseases of 
the mind. 
Mental time travel
Many people have assumed 
that episodic memory is unique 
to humans, and that all other 
members of the animal kingdom 
are incapable of mental time 
travel. The point was made most 
eloquently by Robbie Burns in his 
lament Ode to a Mouse, where he 
returns home at dusk to reflect 
upon the day’s events, having 
accidentally ploughed up the nest 
of a field mouse and watched the 
animal run off into the autumn 
night to perish. Riddled with guilt, 
he consoles himself with the 
thought:
Still thou are blest compared  
w’ me!
The present only touches thee…
Burns’ view of the psychology 
of the field mouse finds an 
echo in the words of many 
current comparative and 
cognitive psychologists, 
including Tulving, who define 
episodic memory, at least in 
part, in terms of the conscious 
experience of recollection. 
This characterization of 
episodic memory presents 
an insurmountable barrier 
to demonstrating this form 
of memory in animals in 
the absence of any agreed 
behavioural markers of 
conscious experience. So 
according to this definition, we 
can never know whether or not 
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episodic memory. After all, it 
should always be remembered 
that absence of evidence does 
not constitute evidence of 
absence. 
Episodic-like memory
This dilemma can be resolved to 
some degree by using Tulving’s 
original definition of episodic 
memory when referring to 
animals, according to which he 
identified episodic recall as the 
retrieval of information about 
‘where’ a unique event or episode 
took place, ‘what’ occurred 
during the episode, and ‘when’ 
the episode happened. 
The merit of this definition is 
that the simultaneous retrieval 
and integration of information 
about these three features of a 
single, unique experience may 
be demonstrated behaviourally 
in animals. We refer to this ability 
as ‘episodic-like memory’ rather 
than episodic memory because 
we have no way of knowing 
whether or not this form of 
remembering is accompanied by 
conscious recollection.
Episodic-like memory by 
food- caching birds
Until recently there was little or 
no evidence that animals could 
recall a specific past experience, 
nor was there any reason to 
believe they would need such a 
memory system in the types of 
laboratory tasks on which they 
were tested. Recently, however, 
we have adopted a different 
approach by considering cases 
in nature in which an animal 
might benefit from the capacity to 
remember a specific past episode 
of what happened where and 
when. 
One example concerns the 
food-caching behaviour of 
members of the crow family, 
which hide or cache a variety 
of perishable foods, such as 
insects and fruit, as well as 
non-perishable nuts and seeds, 
and rely on memory to recover 
these caches at a later date. 
In the laboratory, one species 
of crow, the western scrub- jay, 
demonstrates remarkable 
memories for what they have 
cached on a given day as well as where they hid them. The 
jays also keep track of how 
long ago they cached different 
types of perishable foods that 
decay at different rates, and they 
can even discriminate between 
unique memories of events that 
have similar ‘what’ and ‘where’ 
contents but ones that occurred 
at different times. 
We have concluded from 
such observations that the jays 
form integrated memories about 
what happened where and 
when, rather than encoding the 
information separately (Clayton 
et al. 2003). Furthermore, the 
jays can also remember whether 
another individual was present 
at the time of caching, and if so, 
who was watching when.
The distribution of episodic-like 
memory
The discovery that jays have 
episodic-like memory raises the 
question of whether other animals 
are also capable of remembering 
specific past events. Using a 
design similar to that employed 
with the jays, Babb and Crystal 
(2006) found evidence for 
episodic- like memory in the 
humble laboratory rat. Having 
learned that an attractive food 
was only available after a certain 
time had elapsed since they 
discovered its location, their rats 
returned to this location only 
after the appropriate period had 
passed. Surprisingly, however, 
monkeys failed to show a 
comparable sensitivity to the age 
of their memory in an analogous 
task.
Alternative approaches
Other students of animal 
memory have focussed on 
different criteria for detecting 
episodic- like memory. For 
example, studies of human 
memory suggest that 
remembering and knowing are 
subserved by different retrieval 
processes. In order to retrieve 
an episodic memory, its strength 
has to exceed a threshold, 
whereas simply to know that 
one has encountered a stimulus 
before, one has to discriminate 
whether or not its apparent 
familiarity arises from a genuine 
past encounter. Each of these retrieval 
processes shows a different 
sensitivity to varying the 
payoff costs of being right and 
wrong. By varying these costs, 
Fortin and colleagues (2004) 
demonstrated that the normal 
rat’s ability to recognise  
odours was governed by a 
combination of remembering 
and knowing. Moreover, brain 
lesions in areas equivalent to 
brain regions where damage 
has been reported to produce 
episodic amnesia in humans 
changed the sensitivity of their 
rats to the payoff costs from one 
reflecting both processes to one 
characteristic of familiarity  
alone. 
Others have challenged 
whether the encoding of the 
‘when’ component is central 
to the concept of episodic-like 
memory or whether in fact it is 
the context in which the event 
occurred that is critical. For 
example, remembering two 
meals with the same friend are 
discriminated in memory by 
binding each episode to the 
different contexts provided  
by the two restaurants. 
Eacott and colleagues (2005) 
exploited this concept of 
episodic memory by capitalising 
on the rat’s propensity to seek 
out novelty. Their rats explored 
two different objects placed in 
a certain spatial configuration 
in a particular context, before 
investigating them again in 
a different configuration in a 
second context. Following this 
episode, the rats were exposed 
to one of the objects in a 
different place until they were 
bored with it, an experience that 
enhanced their propensity to 
seek out the other object when 
returned to the original  
contexts. This they could only 
do, however, if they could 
remember where the objects 
were located in a particular 
context during the initial 
episode. Their success at  
this task led Eacott and 
colleagues to argue that the rats 
recollected the object (what) and 
its location (where) in a particular 
context (which) on the basis 




Humans and bees have had a 
long lasting relationship that 
consisted mainly of humans 
robbing the bees of their honey. 
This relationship dates back 
to ancient hunter-gatherer 
cultures and probably to 
non- human ancestors. Even in 
prehistoric times, humans had 
quite sophisticated techniques 
for dealing with bees; cave 
paintings show how ladders 
and ropes were used to get at 
the bees (Figure 1) and how 
smoke was used to calm them. 
Certainly, by the 3rd millennium 
BC in ancient Egypt, beekeeping 
had developed into a fully 
fledged sophisticated practice, 
with specialised beekeeping 
techniques and man-made hives, 
which have largely remained 
unchanged over the centuries. 
The Egyptians worshipped bees 
and thought that they stemmed 
from tears shed by the sun 
god Ra. As a hieroglyph the 
bee symbolised lower Egypt 
(Figure 1).
Successful beekeeping and 
honey harvesting obviously 
required a detailed knowledge 
about bee biology, of their 
sensory capabilities, their life 
cycle and how they propagate. 
But just how detailed did that 
knowledge have to be? And 
what aspects did it entail? It 
turns out that, despite having 
achieved great sophistication 
in bee management, humans 
were, until relatively recently, 
surprisingly ignorant about 
essential features of bee biology, 
in particular bee sex. This may 
be because, until recently, bees 
Essay
Figure 1. An ancient love affair.
A cave painting (left) from La Araña Cave in Spain showing Neolithic honey collec-
tion using ladders or ropes (With permission from Letters from the Hive p12, Bantam 
Books). A hieroglyph of a bee (right), symbolising Lower Egypt from the tomb of pharao 
Senusret I, from his ‘sedge and bee’ title. (From http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
Image:AncientEgyptianRelief-BeeHieroglyph-ROM.png)
Florian Maderspacher
Humans have an ancient and intimate relationship with honey 
bees — from the development of beekeeping in prehistoric times up to 
the recent sequencing of the honey bee genome. Yet, the intimacies of 
bee sexuality remained obscure and contentious until relatively recently. 
Their stepwise unravelling is a tale of advances and misconception that, 
in part, may have stemmed from an all too humanised view of bees.
All the queen’s menRobbie Burns revisited
Whatever the precise conception 
of the content of episodic-like 
memory, these studies suggest 
that at least some animals can 
mentally travel back to their past. 
However, the concept of mental 
time travel we introduced at the 
beginning goes beyond episodic 
memory, as Robbie Burns alluded 
to in his original lament. For, when 
filled with remorse over the fate of 
the field mouse he concluded that 
being stuck in the present was a 
blessing:
But oh I cast my eye on  
prospects drear,
and forwards tho’ I canna see,
I guess and fear. 
This forward-looking aspect 
of mental time travel is only 
just beginning to be explored in 
animals. It may also provide the 
key to understanding episodic 
memory’s errors: for a memory 
that reconstructs pieces of the 
past can also reassemble them 
into imaginary future scenarios. As 
Mark Twain noted so judiciously: 
“My life has been filled with many 
tragedies, most of which never 
occurred.”
Where can I find out more?
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